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BANNING BOOKS, BURNING BRIDGES: 
RECOGNIZING STUDENT FREEDOM 




In Canada, books and magazines are regularly intercepted at the border 
and are consistently removed from libraries, schools and bookstores. 
The banning of books is a controversial topic that involves issues of cen-
sorship and freedom of expression rights. The Supreme Court of Cana-
da recently examined the issue in Chamberlain v. Surrey School District 
No. 36, where it was found that the School Board acted unreasonably in 
banning several books depicting same sex couples. The Court, however, 
did not consider the freedom of expression rights of students in reaching 
their decision. Despite this recent opportunity to comment on a studentʼ’s 
right to information, Canadian jurisprudence remains silent on the is-
sue of student freedom of expression rights in the banning of books from 
schools. Using Chamberlain as a backdrop, this paper will argue that 
a liberal interpretation of studentʼ’s freedom of expression rights by the 
courts would provide much needed guidance for educators in making 
curriculum selections. The recognition of such rights would place the 
interests of the students first in pedagogical decision-making, enhance 
democratic functions within schools, and encourage a rights discourse 
to shape the classroom environment.
† The author is a third-year law student at Dalhousie University. She has a Bachelor of Arts in 
English Literature from Trent, and will be articling at Eberts Symes in Toronto. She intends to 
pursue a career in constitutional and public interest litigation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
From Homer in 387 B.C. to Harry Potter in 2002, book banning is a per-
ennial reality throughout the world. In Canada alone, books and mag-
azines are regularly intercepted at the border and are consistently re-
moved from libraries, schools and bookstores. These actions, however, 
occur amidst a great deal of controversy. The issue of book banning is 
particularly divisive among both proponents and opponents of censor-
ship, and as the recent Supreme Court of Canada case Chamberlain v. 
Surrey School District No. 361 illustrates, the classroom is one forum 
currently embroiled in battles over the censorship of ideas. 
In Chamberlain, the Surrey School Board censored three books 
because they depicted same-sex families. As with all incidents of cen-
sorship, the Boardʼ’s decision raised questions concerning freedom of 
expression rights in Canadian classrooms.2 What is not clear, however, 
is whose freedom of expression rights were at issue. While a teacherʼ’s 
right to freedom of expression has been the subject of healthy debate,3 
the freedom of expression rights of students within the educational 
system have remained virtually unexplored in Canadian legal jurispru-
dence. The Supreme Courtʼ’s treatment of the Chamberlain case did not 
deal with freedom of expression issues; however, it is this authorʼ’s view 
that the case illustrates the need for Canadian courts to do so. Books 
are frequently banned in schools, and while the Court in Chamberlain 
found that the actions of the Surrey School Board were unreasonable, 
the holding was case-specific and did not amount to a condemnation of 
book banning in general. Moreover, while the Chamberlain decision 
acknowledged the fundamental importance of the values and practices 
of all members of the school population, it did not specifically address 
the rights, if any, a student holds in the educational decision-making 
process. Using Chamberlain as a backdrop, this paper will argue that 
a liberal interpretation of studentʼ’s freedom of expression rights by the 
courts would provide much needed guidance for educators in making 
1[2002] S.C.J. No. 87 (QL) [Chamberlain].
2 See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 2(b), Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [Charter].
3 See Ross v. New Brunswick School District No. 15, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 825 [Ross]; R v. Keegstra, 
[1990] 3 S.C.R. 697.
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curriculum selections. Specifically, the recognition of studentsʼ’ freedom 
of expression rights will put their interests front and centre in pedagogi-
cal decision-making, enhance democratic functions within schools, and 
encourage a rights discourse to shape the classroom environment. 
Part I of this paper will outline how and why censorship occurs in 
schools followed by a brief summary of the Chamberlain case and the 
resultant rights issues raised. Part II considers the general freedom of 
expression jurisprudence in Canada, along with American case law on 
free speech in schools, to explore the possible scope of a studentʼ’s ex-
pression rights, including the right to access information. Finally, in Part 
III, the author will posit her view on why a studentʼ’s freedom of expres-
sion rights should be given a broad interpretation and how these rights 
can aid in the curriculum selection process. 
II: HOW AND WHY CENSORSHIP OCCURS
Censorship has been defined as “the removal, suppression or restricted 
circulation of literary, artistic or educational materials-of images, ideas 
and information on the grounds that these are morally or otherwise ob-
jectionable.”4 The reasons to be concerned with censorship are varied 
but as one author suggests: 
The basis of democracy is that people are able to make choices 
about issues which affect their lives, including what they wish 
to see, read, hear or discuss. While this may seem a somewhat 
luxurious distinction, preoccupying perhaps only wealthy western 
democracies, it is a comparatively short distance between censoring 
free expression and the silencing of political dissidents whose views 
are incompatible with those of the prevailing government. The 
distance between such silencing and the use of violence to suppress 
a political philosophy which a government finds inconvenient is 
even shorter. Censorship tends to have small beginnings and to grow 
rapidly.5
4 Henry Reichman, Censorship & Selection: Issues and Answers for Schools, 3rd ed. (Chicago: 
American Library Association, 2001) at 2. 
5 Frances Dʼ’Souza, “A World Without Censorship? The Mission and Achievements of Article 
19,” (1995) 6 Logos at para 12, online: Logos <http://www.osi.hu/cpd/logos/Aworldwithout-
censorship.html>.
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While the above comments may represent the most dramatic concerns 
related to censorship, the point is clear. Censorship, or rather, the lack 
thereof, is intertwined with our notions of a free and democratic soci-
ety. 
There are three significant ways in which censors in an educational 
context can attack a book or other materials.6 The impugned material 
can be subject to a challenge, either through public criticism or through 
written or oral complaint by a parent or community member. It also 
can be subject to state censorship through government policy, school 
board resolution, or through the decision of a school official. A book 
can also be censored through the individual acts of a teacher, who de-
termines that a certain book may be inappropriate or subject to criti-
cism, and neither assigns the book nor reads it aloud in class. Theft of 
individual copies of books from school libraries is another, more subtle 
way, that book censorship can occur. If a book or other material is chal-
lenged, there are several possible outcomes. School officials can ignore 
the complaint, they can limit the book to library usage with or without 
restrictions (e.g. needing parental permission before borrowing a cer-
tain book), they can provide students whose parents object to use of 
certain materials with alternative assignments, or they can ban the book 
altogether. Since school boards, school officials, and teachers are all 
in positions where they must choose which materials will be available 
and/or taught in classrooms, they necessarily walk a fine line between 
legitimate curriculum selection and censorship. When their decisions 
are influenced by parental concerns, this delicate balancing between se-
lection and censorship becomes even more complex. 
While it is true that Canadian schools usually resist demands from 
parental and community groups,7 they are still surprisingly susceptible 
to both book challenges and outright bans. In the United States, where 
incidents of censorship in schools are more frequent, the American Li-
brary Association (ALA) reported 472 challenges in 1999.8 While this 
6 June Calwood, “When the Censor Comes,” online: Freedom to Read <http://www.freedom-
toread.ca/censor/censor03.htm>.
7 Reichman, supra note 4 at 3 (On the whole there are far more challenges to books than there 
are actual removals and/or restrictions on them).
8 Diane Weaver Dunne, “Look Out Harry Potter! Book Banning Heats Up,” (2000), Education 
World, at para 10, online: <Education-World.com/a-admin/admin157>. See also American Li-
brary Association online: <http://www.ala.org/bbooks/challeng.html#mfcb>.
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is down from 762 challenges in 1995, the ALA is concerned that there is 
a higher incidence of self-censorship that goes unreported. Schools ac-
count for seventy-one percent of these reported challenges.9 In addition, 
it is estimated that half of the books that are challenged in the U.S. are 
either temporarily banned or removed permanently.10 
The motivations behind demanding the removal of books are varied, 
but generally can be classified into four categories. Books are challenged 
by those who wish to promote “traditional family values” in schools, by 
those who disagree with the political message a book sends, by those 
who feel the material conflicts with their religious beliefs, and finally by 
those advocating minority rights.11 These concerns are generally linked 
to the protection and appropriate education of children. 
Over the years, the predominant reasons behind book censorship 
have shifted. In the 1980s, a book was more likely to be challenged by 
reason of its explicit language and sexual content. Currently, books are 
more likely to be challenged because of their depiction of witchcraft, 
magic, alternative families, or in the interests of political appropriate-
ness and minority protection. Mark Twainʼ’s The Adventures of Huckle-
berry Finn provides an example of such a shift. The Adventures of Huck-
leberry Finn has experienced decades of censorship in North America, 
the earliest being in 1885 when it was banned from a Massachusetts 
public library. The book was deemed to be “trash suitable only for the 
slums”12 because of the dialect spoken by the central characters. After 
becoming a classic, however, it was challenged for different reasons. 
As early as 1957 the National Association for Advancement of Colored 
People protested the bookʼ’s racist aspects, and the book has continued 
to be challenged well into the 1990s. Opponents claim that it is damag-
ing to the self-esteem of young African-American children, who are too 
young to read the word “nigger,” and even because the book doesnʼ’t 
reject slavery outright.13 
9 This includes both classrooms and school libraries. 
10 Sharon Cromwell, “Banning Books from the Classroom: How to Handle Cries for Censor-
ship” (2001) Education World at para 4, online: <Education-world.com/a_curr/curr031>. See 
also Linda Chion-Kenney, Censorship: Managing the Controversy, (Alexandria, VA: National 
School Boards Association, 1989).
11 Reichman, supra note 4 at 18.
12 Dawn B. Sova, Banned Books: Literature Suppressed on Social Grounds, (New York: Facts 
on File, 1998) at 3.
13 Ibid. at 4.
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In Canada, the grounds on which books are challenged are as varied 
as the themes of the books themselves. Although it appears that more 
books are challenged in the interest of minority protection, there are 
occasions of book banning that represent all of the motivations previ-
ously mentioned. For example, Margaret Laurenceʼ’s The Diviners was 
repeatedly challenged between 1976 and 1994, and at times has even 
been removed from high school curriculums across the country, on the 
grounds that it contains inappropriate sexual content and explicit lan-
guage.14 Other books by Laurence have also been challenged or banned 
on these grounds. In 1988, William Goldingʼ’s Lord of the Flies was 
recommended for removal by the Toronto Board of Education when 
the black community complained that the bookʼ’s depiction of boys 
dressed up like savages was racist.15 In 1991, the Saint John, N.B. black 
community group Pride of Race, Unity & Dignity through Education 
(PRUDE) demanded the removal of The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn 
and Harper Leeʼ’s To Kill a Mockingbird on the grounds that the books 
were racist and promoted racial stereotyping.16 In 1993, To Kill a Mock-
ingbird was removed from schools in the Hamilton, Ontario area, and in 
May 2002, a principal in a Halifax, N.S. school was advised to remove 
In the Heat of the Night, Underground to Canada, and To Kill a Mock-
ingbird because of the use of the word “nigger.”17 
Childrenʼ’s books have also been subject to widespread challenges 
and bans. In 1992, Indian in the Cupboard, by Lynne Reid Banks, was 
temporarily removed from schools in Kamloops, B.C. because of com-
plaints over the bookʼ’s portrayal of Native peoples.18 Though the book 
was eventually reinstated, it remained on a list that indicated to teachers 
that it had previously been challenged. The Impressions series, a set 
of books used for reading in public schools across North America, has 
14 Schools Case Study, “Harry Potter meets…The Dread Book Banners,” online: Freedom to 
Read <www.freedomtoread.ca//kits/2001/pdf/kit2001/pdf>. See also Chronicle of Freedom of 
Expression in Canada, online: <http://insight.mcmaster.ca/org/efc/pages/chronicle>.
15 Sova, supra note 12 at 177. 
16 Schools Case Study, supra note 14.
17 Brian Bauld, “Donʼ’t Kill the Mockingbird” The Halifax Herald (9 May 2002), online: <http://
www.mrbauld.com/mockbb.html>.
18Schools Case Study, supra note 14 (Indian in the Cupboard has won many awards including 
the 1982 New York Time Best Childrenʼ’s Novel. It was also selected as a Distinguished Book 
of 1981 by the Association of Childrenʼ’s Librarians. See online: <http://www.unioldenburg.
de/~filmfest/films/indian_in_the_cupboard>).
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been challenged for its use of “violent images” and “satanic verses” 
in Alberta, Manitoba and Ontario.19 Between 1990 and 1992, the Im-
pressions series represented the most challenged book in the U.S.A.20 
Recently J.K. Rowlingʼ’s Harry Potter series has been subject to much 
of the same criticism. Protesters across the continent fear that the books 
promote witchcraft and worship of the occult. In the United States the 
series was collectively the most challenged book in 1999 and 2001, and 
for the years 1990-2000 it ranked seventh on the list of most frequently 
challenged books in the U.S.21 In 2000, a Durham, Ontario school board 
banned the series from classrooms after receiving twenty phone calls 
and ten letters from a Christian fundamentalist community demanding 
the seriesʼ’ removal. After much public debate, the book ban was re-
scinded.22 In 1992, the International Woodworkers of America called 
for the removal a book entitled Maxineʼ’s Tree by Diane Leger from the 
Sechelt, B.C. school district libraries, because they believed the book 
indoctrinated children with anti-logging and conservationist values.23 
While the grounds upon which books are challenged are varied, the par-
ties challenging books in schools are equally diverse. It is important to 
recognize, however, that these examples represent a mere cross-selec-
tion of book challenges and book banning incidents across Canada. It is 
a persistent, frequent, and endemic concern for educators and for those 
concerned with the status of the education system. Moreover, it is a 
phenomenon relatively free from rights based examination. Chamber-
lain marks the first and only time that a censorship issue in a Canadian 
classroom has been decided by the courts. 
19Impressions edited by Jack Booth et al. is a language arts series for grades 1-6, published in 
1984 and used as an educational tool throughout North America. See Brown v. Woodland Joint 
Unified School Dist. 27 F.3d 1373 (9th Cir. 1994) (the Court ruled that the schoolʼ’s use of the 
Impressions series for activities which asked children to discuss witches or create poetic chants 
did not violate the “no preference clause” of the California Constitution; challenged selections 
from the teaching aid were not created or incorporated into the curriculum for the purpose of 
preferring or advancing witchcraft).
20 American Library Association, supra note 8.
21American Library Association, supra note 8, online: <http://www.ala.org/bbooks/
top100bannedbooks.html> (out of 6,364 challenges reported to or recorded by the Office for 
Intellectual Freedom, as compiled by the Office for Intellectual Freedom, American Library 
Association. See Background Information: 1990–2000 under The Most Frequently Challenged 
Books of 2000. Research suggests that for each challenge reported there are as many as four or 
five which go unreported).
22 Schools Case Study, supra note 14.
23 Schools Case Study, supra note 14.
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1. Chamberlain v. Surrey School District No. 36
In 1996, James Chamberlain, a kindergarten teacher, took three books 
to the school board to be approved as educational resource material for 
the Kindergarten-Grade One (K-1) level in the Surrey School District. 
If approved, the three books would then be generally available to all 
K-1 classrooms in the district, although their actual use would depend 
upon the discretion of individual teachers. The three books were en-
titled Ashaʼ’s Mums;24 Belindaʼ’s Bouquet;25 and One Dad, Two Dads, 
Brown Dad, Blue Dads.26 Each of the books included representations 
of same-sex families. In April, 1997 the School Board passed a resolu-
tion not to approve the three books as learning resources for classroom 
use, primarily because they were concerned about the religious views 
of many of the families that attended the school. Mr. Chamberlain chal-
lenged the resolution on the grounds that the board had acted outside of 
their mandate under the School Act27 and that the resolution violated the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.28 
At the B.C. Supreme Court, many parents and community mem-
bers filed affidavits in support of the School Boardʼ’s resolutions. Their 
concerns were as follows: the books raised issues of sexual behaviour, 
advocated a “homosexual lifestyle,” and introduced confusing issues to 
children to young to learn about sexuality.29 Some opposed the books 
on moral grounds, and some simply didnʼ’t want the subject broached in 
school. Additionally, some parents felt that the use of the books negated 
their right to teach their children according to their own religious be-
liefs, and there were others who felt that where values taught at school 
conflicted with those taught at home, young children would be confused. 
Some authors refer to this concern as fear of “cultural relativism”—the 
fear that exposing children to diverse perspectives will teach them that 
24 Rosamund Edwin & Michele Paulse, Ashaʼ’s Mums, (N.p.: Womenʼ’s Press 1990).
25 Leslea Newman, Belindaʼ’s Bouquet, (N.p. 1991).
26 Johnny Valentine, One Dad, Two Dads, Brown Dad, Blue Dads, (N.p.: Alyson Wonderland 
1994).
27 R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 412, s. 76.
28 Supra note 2 at ss. 2(a), 2(b), 15.
29 Chamberlain v. Surrey School District No. 36 (1998), 168 D.L.R. (4th) 222 (B.C.S.C.) at 247-
48 [Chamberlain BCSC]. 
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there is no such thing as truth, resulting in a “spiritual wasteland.”30 
Religious leaders also expressed concern that the books depicted homo-
sexuality in a positive light, contrary to the Biblical doctrine that forms 
the basis of their beliefs.31
Mr. Chamberlain, while claiming the book ban violated the School 
Act, also claimed that it violated parentʼ’s, teacherʼ’s and studentʼ’s 2(a) 
freedom of religion, 2(b) freedom of expression, and section 15 equality 
rights under the Charter. Section 15 rights were implicated because the 
ban “effectively denies the validity of same-sex couples as legitimate 
family groupings in society.”32 Section 2(a) rights were at issue as dem-
onstrated by the views above, however, the religious freedom of those 
who supported the use of the books was also potentially infringed, as 
the book ban forced all those involved to conform to a particular reli-
gious view.33 Section 2(b) freedom of expression rights were implicated 
by the repression of certain books based upon their content or subject 
matter.34 Specifically, the denial of the books resulted in constraints on 
expression manifest in two ways. First, teachers and students were not 
permitted to discuss certain family configurations. Second, the ban re-
sulted in a denial of access to information about certain types of family 
models.35 
The majority of the Supreme Court was able to dispose of the case 
using the School Act, and thus did not touch upon the Charter issues. 
Though he was speaking in dissent, Justice Gonthier did articulate that 
“this case engages the section 15, section 2(a) and section 2(b) rights of 
both the appellants (Chamberlain) and the parents who expressed their 
views to the School Board.”36  Notably absent, however, was any men-
tion of the Charter rights of the students in Mr. Chamberlainʼ’s class. 
30 Sherry H. Swindler, “Why the Expert Testimony of Teachers Should be Considered in Book 
Banning” (1993) 6 U. Fla. J.L. & Pub. Polʼ’y. 99 at 119.
31 Chamberlain BCSC, supra note 29 at 248.
32Shaheen Shariff, Roland Case & Michael Manley-Casimer, “Balancing Competing Rights in 
Education—The Surrey School Boardʼ’s Book Ban” (2002) 10 Educ & L.J. 47 at 71.
33 R v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 at 346-47 (Chief Justice Dickson observed 
that freedom of religion protects equally freedom of belief and freedom of non-belief) [Big M]. 
34 Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (A.G.), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 [Irwin Toy].
35 Shariff, Case & Manley-Casimer, supra note 32 at 103.
36 Chamberlain, supra note 3 at para. 126.
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At the B.C. Supreme Court, the School Board resolution was over-
turned on the grounds that the decision violated the requirement under 
the School Act that schools conduct themsevles in a secular manner.37 At 
the Court of Appeal, the School Boardʼ’s decision was restored. At the 
Supreme Court of Canada, a 7-2 majority allowed the appeal. The ma-
jority held that the School Boardʼ’s decision violated the requirements of 
secularism and non-discrimination under the School Act.38 Further, they 
held that the Board had proceeded on an “exclusionary basis” by acting 
out of concern for one view in the community and ignoring the inter-
ests of same-sex families. The School Board had made their decision 
based upon whether or not the books were “necessary” to the curricu-
lum, rather than basing it upon the three booksʼ’ relevance.39 The School 
Board was ordered to make a decision based upon more appropriate 
considerations. 
The majority specifically found that the curriculum for K-1 level 
required that a broad array of family models be taught and that a secular 
school cannot exclude lawful family models on the grounds that some 
people morally object to those models.40 The meaning of “secularism” 
in the School Act required that schools recognize the diverse multi-cul-
tural reality in B.C. and teach values of tolerance and respect for all 
families.41 However, the majority also recognized the essential role that 
parents play in directing the education of their children and did not pre-
clude the possibility that religious and/or moral view points in the com-
munity can have a role in shaping educational policy.42 
While the decision resulted in a victory for James Chamberlain and 
those who supported the use of the books, and for the most part rec-
ognized the interests at stake (e.g. equality rights for different types of 
families, the rights of parents to be involved in educational decision-
making, and the rights of those with religious views to have their views 
be heard), what is missing from the decision is a discussion of the rights, 
if any, that students possess in the battle over what is taught in the class-
room. Specifically, can and should a studentʼ’s freedom of expression 
37 Chamberlain BCSC, supra note 29 at 222.
38 Chamberlain, supra note 3 at para. 18.
39 Chamberlain, supra note 3 at para. 63.
40 Chamberlain, supra note 3 at para. 20. 
41 Chamberlain, supra note 3 at para. 21.
42 Chamberlain, supra note 3 at para. 19 & 30.
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right influence educational policies regarding what materials are used? 
The decision also gives no clear direction (aside from the ambiguous 
outer limits of relevance) regarding when or if a book can be legiti-
mately banned. Further still, the decision is lacking in guidance on how 
exactly religion can influence educational policy without violating 15 or 
2(a) of the Charter, or how competing parental views can be accommo-
dated within the curriculum. It is this authorʼ’s view that recognizing and 
defining a studentʼ’s right to freedom of expression can and should play a 
significant role in the balancing of these competing interests. Moreover, 
allowing for the freedom of expression rights of students is a vital com-
ponent of the education process. Part II of this paper will explore the 
possible nature and scope of a studentʼ’s freedom of expression rights. 
PART III: THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF SECTION 2(B) RIGHTS
Section 32 of the Charter indicates that it applies to actions of the govern-
ment. In order for the School Boardʼ’s resolution to be subject to Charter 
scrutiny, it must first be determined whether or not the School Board is 
government, or a government actor.43 While the Court has never ruled 
on this explicitly, it is generally assumed that schools and school boards 
constitute government; hence, the Charter applies to their actions.44 
Section 2(b) of the Charter states that: 
Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: (b) freedom of 
thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the 
press and other media of communication.45 
In Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (A.G.)46, Cory J. stated the importance 
of freedom of expression rights to Canadian society: 
It is difficult to imagine a guaranteed right more important to a 
democratic society. Indeed a democracy cannot exist without the 
freedom to express new ideas and to put forward opinions about the 
43 See McKinney v. University of Guelph, [1990] 3. S.C.R. 229. 
44 See R v. M.R.M., [1998] 3 S.C.R. 393 at 410 [M.R.M.]
45 Charter, supra note 2 at s. 2(b).
46 [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326.
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functioning of public institutions. The concept of free and uninhibited 
speech permeates all truly democratic societies and institutions.47
In Irwin Toy, the majority said that freedom of expression is “funda-
mental because in a free and pluralistic and democratic society we prize 
diversity of ideas and opinions for their inherent value both to com-
munities and to the individual.”48 Freedom of expression is particularly 
significant among the fundamental freedoms guaranteed in the Char-
ter because it allows for the meaningful exercise of all other freedoms. 
Walter Tarnopolsky has said: 
Where freedom of expression exists, the beginning of a free society 
and a means for every extension of liberty are already present. Free 
expression is therefore unique among liberties: it promotes and 
protects all the rest.49 
In other words, freedom of expression is “the matrix, the indispensable 
condition of nearly every other form of freedom.”50 In Irwin Toy, the 
majority articulated the purposes underlying 2(b) protection:
(1) Seeking and attaining truth is an inherently good activity; (2) 
participation in social and political decision making is to be fostered 
and encouraged; and (3) the diversity in forms of individual self-
fulfillment and human flourishing ought to be cultivated in an 
essentially tolerant, indeed welcoming, environment not only for 
the sake of those who convey a meaning but also for those to who 
it is conveyed.51 
Finally, in R. v. Zundel, the Court noted that the purpose of freedom of 
expression “extends to the protection of minority beliefs which the ma-
jority regards as wrong or false.”52 So as the Supreme Court of Canada 
47 Ibid. at 1336.
48 Supra note 34 at 968.
49 Walter Tarnopolsky et al., eds., Newspapers and the Law, vol. 3 (Ottawa: Research Publica-
tions of the Royal Commission on Newspapers, 1981) at 7. 
50 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) at 327 (Justice Cardozoʼ’s words were quoted in 
Irwin Toy at 968).
51 Supra note 34 at 976.
52 [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731 at 752-3.
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has said on more than one occasion, in light of its importance, the scope 
of freedom of expression must be very broad.53 
In Irwin Toy, the Court laid out a two-part analysis for determin-
ing whether 2(b) has been infringed. First, one must determine whether 
or not the activity at issue falls within the scope of 2(b), specifically, 
whether the activity is a form of expression. There can be little doubt 
that a book and/or the reading of a book are forms of expression. The 
second part of the analysis involves a determination of whether or not 
the purpose or effect of the state action in question was to restrict free-
dom of expression. When the purpose of the state action is to restrict the 
conveyance of a particular meaning, then there will be an infringement 
of freedom of expression. In the Chamberlain case, the School Board 
was attempting to restrict content-specific materials (books with same-
sex family portrayals), hence 2(b) would be violated. However, if the 
purpose of a state action is not aimed at content per se, the effect of the 
action can still violate a personʼ’s expression rights if he or she can prove 
that an activity promotes at least one of the above principles outlined in 
Irwin Toy, and that the state action interferes with that pursuit. 
The Supreme Court has further determined that expression rights 
on public property require particular consideration. Public schools are 
undoubtedly public property; hence, any freedom of expression right 
in schools will be subject to this factor. In Comité pour la république 
du Canada v. Canada, the Court split on the section 2(b) analysis with 
respect to public property.54 Justice Lamerʼ’s view advocated that:
If the expression takes a form that contravenes or is inconsistent 
with the function of the place where the attempt to communicate is 
made, such a form of expression must be considered to fall outside 
the sphere of s. 2(b).55 
Chief Justice McLachlin suggested a broader view towards expression 
on public property; to determine whether or not an activity on public 
property falls within the sphere of 2(b), the test should be based upon: 
53 See Irwin Toy, supra note 34 at 970.
54 [1991] 1 S.C.R. 139 [Comité].
55 Ibid. at 157.
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The values and interests at stake and should not be confined to 
characteristics of particular types of government property. Reflecting 
the concepts traditionally associated with free expression (i.e. the 
purposes outlined in Irwin Toy) it should extend constitutional 
protection to expression on some but not all government property.56 
Justice Lʼ’Heureux-Dubé argued that given the importance of expression 
on public property, restrictions could only be justified under section 1 
of the Charter. While the courts have yet to determine which approach 
to follow, each could have particular implications for the public school 
context. However, it does seem counterintuitive to conclude that even 
under Justice Lamerʼ’s narrow view, exposure to certain family models 
through reading a book aloud would interfere with the function of a 
public school classroom. This idea will be expanded upon shortly. 
As with all other fundamental freedoms under the Charter, section 
2(b) is subject to section 1, which provides that limits on freedom of 
expression will be valid only if they can be demonstrably justified in a 
free and democratic society.57 In the educational sphere, the onus will 
be on school authorities to justify any limits they place on student rights 
and freedoms. Using the approach outlined in R v. Oakes, the objec-
tive behind the limitation would have to be “pressing and substantial.”58 
School authorities would then have to demonstrate that the method used 
to infringe the right was rationally connected to the objective underly-
ing the limitation, and that the limitation was as minimally impairing 
as possible. Finally, school authorities would have to demonstrate the 
proportionality between the deleterious and salutary effects of the limi-
tation. 
While this has the potential to be an additional limitation on expres-
sion rights, it is conceivable that section 1 could also be a useful tool for 
students and those setting school policies, as it requires school officials 
to clearly articulate the justification for rules that may have the effect of 
limiting studentʼ’s rights.59 Furthermore, as Big M suggests, any limits on 
freedom of expression must be sufficiently important and “necessary to 
protect public safety, order, health, or morals, or the fundamental rights 
56 Ibid. at 236-7.
57 See R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103. 
58 Ibid at para. 73.
59 Ailsa M. Watkinson, Education, Student Rights and the Charter, (Saskatoon: Purich, 1999) 
at 44.
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and freedom of others.”60 Therefore, limitations on oneʼ’s expression 
rights would have to meet a fairly high threshold of justification.
In summary, while 2(b) freedom of expression rights have a broad 
scope, they are inherently limited on public property, and externally 
limited by section 1. No doubt, both of these limits will affect the scope 
of a studentʼ’s right to freedom of expression in schools. Since the courts 
have yet to provide specific guidance on how a studentʼ’s expression 
rights might be influenced by these limitations, the American experi-
ence may prove instructive. 
1. Studentsʼ’ Rights in Schools
In the United States, the general starting point in a discussion on student 
rights is the landmark case Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Commu-
nity School District.61 In this case, a group of students came to school 
wearing black armbands in protest of the Vietnam War. The school sus-
pended them, but the students applied for an injunction restraining the 
school from pursuing disciplinary action. The case eventually reached 
the U.S. Supreme Court, where the majority opinion noted that neither 
teachers nor students “shed their Constitutional rights at the school 
house gate.”62 Specifically, Tinker held that students have substantive 
expression rights in school. In order for the school to justify any prohi-
bition of expression, it would have to demonstrate that: 
Its action was caused by something more than a mere desire to 
avoid discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompanies an 
unpopular viewpoint. Certainly, where there is no finding and no 
showing that engaging in the forbidden conduct would materially 
and substantially interfere with the requirement of appropriate 
discipline in the operation of the school, the prohibition cannot be 
sustained.63
In Canada, the Charter applies to all Canadian citizens, and as Lutes 
v. Board of Education of Prairie View School Division No. 74 demon-
60 Supra note 33 at 337.
61 393 U.S. 503 (1969) [Tinker].
62 Ibid. at 506.
63 Ibid.
140 – DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
strates, students do have freedom of expression rights.64 In Lutes, the 
applicant sought an injunction restraining the school from disciplining 
him for singing a rap song called “Letʼ’s Talk About Sex” by the group 
“Salt ʻ‘Nʼ’ Pepa.” Justice Barclay held that the grade nine student was 
disciplined primarily for singing a banned song and that this violated 
his freedom of expression as guaranteed by the Charter.65 But while 
students ostensibly have Charter rights, these rights are potentially lim-
ited in ways that the rights of other citizens are not. In M.R.M., a case 
that dealt with the constitutionality of a search performed by a school 
official, the Supreme Court of Canada examined the extent to which 
students have the right to privacy while on school property.66 While the 
Court recognized that “schools have a duty to foster the respect of their 
students for the constitutional rights of all members of society”67 and 
that “these values are best taught by example and may be undermined 
if the studentʼ’s rights are ignored by those in authority,”68 the Court also 
found that a lower expectation of privacy was justified in the interests of 
ensuring the safety of all students, to prevent violation of school rules, 
and to promote an orderly environment.69 While this decision was con-
textual in that it related to concerns over drug use on school property, 
it is possible that the principle of reduced rights for students could be 
transferable if it is felt that reducing such rights will promote safety, 
obedience or orderliness in schools.
American jurisprudence supports this concern. In Hazelwood 
School District v. Kuhlmeier, a school principal removed two articles 
from a student newspaper.70 Students filed a suit claiming that this vio-
lated their First Amendment right to free speech. The Supreme Court 
held that the principal was acting reasonably and that as long as his ac-
tions were related to “reasonable pedagogical concerns,”71 there was no 
64 (1992), 101 Sask. R. 232 (Q.B.) [Lutes].
65 Ibid. at 239.
66 M.R.M., supra note 44.
67 M.R.M., supra note 44 at 401.
68 M.R.M., supra note 44 at 402.
69 M.R.M., supra note 44 at 414.
70484 US 260 (1988) [Hazelwood].
71 Ibid. at 261 (“A school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its basic 
educational mission, even though the government could not censor similar speech outside the 
school”).
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First Amendment violation. This is a much narrower allowance for stu-
dent expression than Tinkerʼ’s test of limiting expression only where it 
“materially or substantially interferes” with the operation of the school. 
Schools were found to have a right to exercise greater control over free-
dom of expression when seeking to protect students from materials that 
may be inappropriate for their level of maturity.72 This approach was 
followed in Virgil v. School Board of Columbia County, where a ban on 
a high school text book which contained selections from Aristophanesʼ’ 
Greek comedy Lysistrata and Geoffrey Chaucerʼ’s The Millers Tale was 
upheld.73 The booksʼ’ use of “explicit sexuality” and “excessively vulgar 
language” were held to be legitimate pedagogical concerns. In Bethel 
School District No. 403 v. Fraser, the Supreme Court held that the pro-
tection of the rights of other students was sufficiently important to war-
rant a restriction on the expression rights of a high school student giving 
a sexually suggestive speech.74 Moreover, the Court held that a studentʼ’s 
right of expression would not necessarily be given the same latitude as 
those of an adult.75 These cases provide further justifications for limiting 
a studentʼ’s right to freedom of expression which, if followed in Canada, 
could prevent a variety of materials (including the Chamberlain books) 
from being taught in classrooms. 
As Wayne Mackay argues, one crucial aspect of freedom of expres-
sion is control over access to school curricular material.76 The right to 
access information, or rather the “right to read,” is a corollary right to 
any freedom of expression and has been upheld by the Supreme Court 
of Canada on more than one occasion. Without the right to access ex-
pressive material, any right to express oneself would be rendered mean-
ingless. In Ford v. Quebec (A.G.) the Court held that freedom of expres-
sion extends to listeners as well as speakers.77 More recently, in Little 
Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada, Justice Binnie held that “the 
constitution protects the right to receive expressive material as much as 
72 Shariff, Case & Manley-Casimer, supra note 32 at 95.
73 862 F.2d 1517 (11th Cir. 1989). 
74 478 U.S. 675.
75 Ibid. at 683.
76 Wayne Mackay, “The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: A Springboard to Student 
Rights” (1984) 4 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 174 at 220.
77 [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712.
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it does the right to create it.”78 Although this case involved the censor-
ing of sexually explicit materials at the border, the principle is equally 
applicable to other contexts where expression rights are implicated. A 
studentʼ’s right to access books will no doubt be interpreted as a precon-
dition to any right of expression. The American jurisprudence supports 
this viewpoint, with some qualifications. 
The leading case in the United States concerning a studentʼ’s right to 
access information is Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free Sch. 
No. 26 v. Pico.79 In this case, the School Board sought the removal of 
nine books from the school library because they were “anti-American, 
anti-Christian, anti-Semitic, and just plain filthy.”80 The Supreme Court, 
in a 5-4 decision, held that the right to receive ideas was a “necessary 
predicate to the recipientʼ’s meaningful exercise of his own rights of 
speech, press and political freedom.”81 In other words, to exercise rights 
to expression in any meaningful way requires the right to access ideas 
– in this case, the right to access ideas through reading. If the School 
Boardʼ’s decision was based upon the intent to deny access to certain 
ideas with which they disagreed, then the decision was unconstitutional. 
While schools are entrusted with the duty to teach community values 
they must also encourage autonomy of thought. As the majority judg-
ment further held:
Just as access to ideas makes it possible for citizens generally to 
exercise their rights of free speech and press in a meaningful manner, 
such access prepares students for active and effective participation 
in the pluralistic, often contentious society in which they will soon 
be adult members. Of course all First Amendment rights accorded 
to students must be construed in light of the special characteristics 
of the school environment.82
78 [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1120. 
79 102 S.Ct. 2799 (U.S. 1982). [Island Trees] (The nine books at issue were Slaughter House 
Five, by Kurt Vonnegut; The Naked Ape, by Desmond Morris; Down these Mean Streets, by Piri 
Thomas; Best Short Stories of Negro Writers, edited by Langston Hughes; Go Ask Alice, anony-
mous; Black Boy, by Richard Wright; Laughing Boy, by Oliver LaFarge; A Hero Ainʼ’t Nothin 
But a Sandwich, by Alice Childress; and Soul on Ice, by Eldridge Cleaver).
80 Sova, supra note 12 at 44.
81 Island Trees, supra note 79 at 2808.
82 Island Trees, supra note 79 at 2808.
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While the “right to read” was considered integral to any meaningful 
expression rights, the modification of First Amendment rights in light 
of the special characteristics of the school environment is a particularly 
significant  consideration when considering the possible limits upon a 
studentʼ’s freedom of expression rights. An earlier U.S. case points to a 
few of these characteristics. In Zykan v. Warsaw (Indiana) Community 
School Corporation, a high school student filed a claim seeking to re-
verse a schoolʼ’s decision to remove certain books and subjects from the 
curriculum.83 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled 
that schools have the discretion to establish the curriculum, but they 
were prohibited from imposing a “pall of orthodoxy”84 on the class-
room. Students would have the right to complain but they would have 
to meet a very high threshold before a constitutional violation would be 
found. Zykan further suggested that the “right to know” might be limited 
by a studentʼ’s level of intellectual development. 
In the classroom setting, the “right to know,” similar to any “right 
to express,” is vulnerable because of its limited practicability. Students 
canʼ’t say whatever they want, and it is impossible for educators to teach 
everything; hence, where would the line be drawn? Furthermore, the 
availability of information elsewhere (in Chamberlain the books were 
always available for use in the library) complicates the scope of the 
right to access information. A significant mitigating factor in upholding 
the ban in Virgil, for example, was the fact that while banned from the 
classroom, the book remained available to students in the library. 
In summary, not only are there limitations on general rights of free-
dom of expression, if American jurisprudence is any guide, it also seems 
likely that the courts will be willing to adopt further restrictions on any 
studentʼ’s right to the same. While students no doubt have freedom of 
expression rights and it obvious that a school cannot make decisions 
regarding curriculum based solely on one particular view, given the 
schoolʼ’s interest in maintaining order and discipline, it seems clear that 
any expression that is deemed incompatible with these purposes will be 
restricted. In light of section 1 of the Charter and the Courtʼ’s recogni-
tion that expression on public property is different from expression else-
where, it is probable that while student freedom of expression rights ex-
83 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980) [Zykan].
84 Ibid.
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ist, they will be balanced against a myriad of other interests. Moreover, 
Justice Lamerʼ’s approach in Comité is compatible with the approach 
taken by the court in Hazelwood. 
Schools can limit expression if it is reasonable to do so in relation 
to their academic purpose. Although the judiciary did not engage in a 
discussion about expression rights, the decision in Chamberlain also 
supports this view. The three books were deemed pedagogically related 
to the curriculum requirements for K-1 classes. Hence, it was unrea-
sonable for the School Board to refuse their approval. However, if the 
books had not been related to the reasonable educational needs of the 
curriculum, it is possible that the result in Chamberlain might have been 
different. The term “reasonable educational needs,” however, is exceed-
ingly vague and it is not clear where the line will be drawn between 
relevant and irrelevant resource materials. 
While different contextually, M.R.M.ʼ’s stated interest in the protec-
tion of others as a justification for limiting student rights is compatible 
with the reasons outlined in Bethel for a limitation on student speech. 
Although perhaps not explicitly stated, M.R.M. clearly implies that stu-
dents do not have the same rights as adults. Moreover, as Chamberlain 
suggests, any student rights to expression and/or right to access infor-
mation will be balanced against the interests of parents and the interests 
of those with religious beliefs. While  students can challenge these de-
cisions, the threshold for proving a violation of student rights may be 
high. 
Any time a book is banned from a classroom, a studentʼ’s freedom 
of expression right is threatened. Nevertheless, there is obviously a fine 
line between censorship and legitimate discretion in selecting materi-
als. Henry Reichman argues that the difference between censorship and 
selection lies in the fact that: 
The censor seeks reasons to exclude materials while those engulfed 
in the process of selection look for ways to include the widest 
possible variety of textbooks, library materials and curricular 
supplements….85 
85 Reichman, supra note 4 at 7.
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While the selector takes into account a variety of concerns, the censorʼ’s 
judgment “is that of the individual.”86 This is not to say that objections 
to certain materials in the classroom arenʼ’t important. Indeed as Reich-
man articulates:
Objections made by parents and others to school classroom and 
library materials must be seen as an important and valuable part 
of the democratic and educational process. Although many, if not 
most, challenges to such materials do amount to little more than 
censorship attempts—and should therefore be rejected—the 
challenge process itself is a legitimate and very important avenue 
for communication.87 
If bona fide curriculum selection does not necessarily infringe expres-
sion rights, and if the input of parents and community members is still 
a valuable part of the process, why are studentsʼ’ freedom of expression 
rights still important to recognize and define? It is this authorʼ’s view 
that the recognition of a broadly defined freedom of expression right for 
children can provide an additional tool for educators when grappling 
with difficult curriculum choices. 
IV: THE BENEFITS OF RECOGNIZING A STUDENTʼ’S FREEDOM 
OF EXPRESSION INTEREST
1. Freedom of Expression Rights Further the Purpose of the 
Educational System
As previously discussed, freedom of expression, specifically the ex-
change of ideas, is of fundamental importance to a democratic and plu-
ralistic culture. One of the primary purposes of education is the incul-
cation of values necessary for participation in society. As the Supreme 
Court of Canada has previously acknowledged:
A school is a communication center for a whole range of values 
and aspirations of a society. In large part, it defines the values that 
transcend society through the educational medium. The school is 
86 Reichman, supra note 4 at 7.
87 Reichman, supra note 4 at 7.
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an arena for the exchange of ideas and must, therefore, be premised 
upon principles of tolerance and impartiality so that all persons 
within the school environment feel equally free to participate.88
Promoting a studentʼ’s right to freedom of expression enhances the 
democratic function of the education system. It encourages students to 
explore many different points of view, both good and bad, and allows 
a rights discourse to permeate the classroom. If the goal of education 
is to provide the very foundation for good citizenship,89 then receiving 
treatment consistent with the values that the education system seeks to 
instill is vital to the maintenance of a democratic society.90 Children can 
learn as much from a teacherʼ’s actions as they do from the actual course 
material. As McKay posits quite succinctly:
Children learn what they live, and if we wish to prepare them to 
exercise democratic rights and freedoms in adulthood, they should 
experience such rights in the schools. By so doing, they can learn 
by example and experience what it is to have rights and obligations. 
They also can learn to respect and treat others fairly, because they 
can perceive that they themselves receive respect and fairness from 
the people that guide them in their day to day surroundings. Students 
can also learn that rights have limits and must be balanced against 
the rights of others.91 
Consequently, if a teacher is permitted to remove material without con-
templating a childʼ’s expression interest, the child will learn that ignor-
ing the rights of others is permissible, thus undermining the principles 
of tolerance and diversity that are the foundation of a democratic sys-
tem. This is something that the courts have previously admonished.92 
Allowing for recognition and discussion on a studentʼ’s freedom of 
expression rights would, additionally, counteract the ʻ‘chilling effectʻ‘ 
that occurs when books are removed from classrooms.93 As discussed, 
teachers may self-censor materials that may or may not be objectiona-
88 Ross, supra note 3 at 856.
89 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
90 A. Wayne McKay & Kimberly Lewis, “Teaching citizenship by example: Studentʼ’s Rights in 
the School Context” (N.p.).
91 Ibid. 
92 See M.R.M., supra note 44.
93 Joan DelFattore, What Johnny Shouldnʼ’t Read: Textbook Censorship in America, (New Ha-
ven: Yale University Press, 1992) at 108.
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ble. This is particularly problematic since the extent to which it occurs is 
difficult to account for. If a teacher is faced with the dilemma of whether 
or not he should present potentially controversial material and does not 
wish to face an ordeal similar to Mr. Chamberlainʼ’s, it is likely that he 
will quietly reject the impugned materials. In a more discreet way, the 
opportunity for students to explore a wide range of ideas is lost and the 
potential for creating a more informed, and hence more tolerant, society 
is undermined. When certain ideas are prohibited from dissemination, 
it supports the view that those ideas are unacceptable, and it also denies 
children the opportunity to develop skills necessary for participation in 
a democratic society:94 
To be able to participate in an active, conscious way with other 
people in a democratic decision-making process, children must be 
able to comprehend that others may have different points of view, 
different feelings, and different reactions than their own.95
If a teacher is aware of the need to consider a childʼ’s freedom of expres-
sion rights, he or she may be more willing to use materials that represent 
a wide variety of perspectives. This is turn may decrease the perceived 
threat of self-censorship in schools. 
2. Freedom of Expression Rights Prevent Indoctrination
While it is possible that the lack of litigation in Canada regarding book 
banning in schools indicates a greater tolerance toward state limita-
tions,96 in the United States one of the pervading philosophies fueling 
censorship litigation in schools is the anti-indoctrination theory. Many 
individuals view the education system itself as a threat to freedom of 
thought. As one author posits:
In the public school context, agents of government play a far more 
dominating and censoring role in the thought development process 
94 Shariff, Case & Manley-Casimer, supra note 32 at 81. See also Pratt v. Independent School 
District No. 831, 670 F. 2d. 771 (8th Cir. 1982).
95 Natalie Hevener Kaufman & Malfrid Grude Flekkay, “Participation Rights of the Child”(1998) 
18 Child. Legal Rts. J. 15 at 19.
96 McKay, supra note 76 at 215.
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than government is permitted to play within the broader confines of 
a democratic society.97
If the American public education system produces citizens whose 
minds have been consciously molded in a particular manner, the 
exercise of free expression by those citizens cannot really be free in 
any meaningful sense.98
Since education is compulsory and students are in some ways a “captive 
audience” of the state, they are more susceptible to being told what to 
think.99 Freedom of expression rights, including the freedom to access 
a wide variety of ideas, would counteract this process of indoctrination 
and promote independent thinking. In order to prepare students for par-
ticipation in the democratic political process, they must learn that there 
are a wide range of viewpoints and that not all people agree. As Karen 
Daly argues:
The right to hear dissenting voices is necessary to counteract the 
generally orthodox nature of compulsory education, and will support 
a model of tolerance and participation in a pluralist democracy. 100 
3. Freedom of Expression Rights as a Tool for Negotiating Between 
Competing Interests
Freedom of expression, as previously discussed, is a right that allows for 
the meaningful exercise of all other freedoms. It is not a shared value; 
it is borne of a disability to agree.101 In light of this origin, freedom of 
expression should be able to play a vital role in reconciling competing 
interests within the education system. As Michael Manely-Casimer sug-
gests, conflict in the school system usually revolves around which values 
are taught, hence the law can be an “authoritative means for the inter-
97 Martin H. Redish & Kevin Finnerty, “What Did You Learn in School Today? Free Speech, 
Values Inculcation and the Democratic-Educational Paradox” (2002 ) 88 Cornell L. Rev. 62 at 
64.
98 Ibid. at 67.
99 Robert Gordon, “Freedom of Expression & Values Inculcation in the Public Schools Curricu-
lum” (1984) 13 J.L. & Educ. 523 at 535.
100 Karen Daly, “Balancing Act: Teacherʼ’s Classroom Speech and the First Amendment” (2000) 
30 J.L. & Educ. 1 at 30.
101 Joseph Heath, “Citizenship Education & Diversity” (2002) 42 Education Canada 3. 
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pretation of values” and the Charter can be a “fundamentally important 
vehicle for adjudicating competing claims.”102 In a book banning case, 
there are usually many competing interests at stake. In Chamberlain, 
for example, the interests of parents, students and the state were impli-
cated. As McKay argues, and as the Chamberlain case demonstrates, 
where there is conflict between parental interests and the interests of 
the school authorities, a studentʼ’s interests can get lost in the shuffle.103 
The recognition of studentʼ’s expression rights can militate against other 
competing interests by putting student rights in the forefront. As McKay 
further suggests:
Total parental dominance, where the childʼ’s legal status or personality 
is subsumed completely within that of the parent, no longer seems 
commensurate with many of the values of the Charter. The interests 
of parents and their children do not always coincide, and the Charter 
offers some potential for direct access to justice for the young, 
as well as providing a model for practice of both autonomy and 
fairness.104
If there is a presumption that students have more access to ideas, or that 
their expression rights are paramount in the context of book banning, 
it will require competing interest groups to meet a higher threshold of 
proof as to why a particular material should be removed from a class-
room. Any decision to remove materials based upon competing interests 
would necessarily be balanced against a studentʼ’s right to access the 
information. Further, the implementation of a “rights discourse” result-
ing from the recognition of student expression rights will encourage 
discussion of “legal rights” in classrooms. For example, schools can 
teach messages of tolerance (e.g. that being gay is legally permissible 
without teaching that it is morally okay). This distinction would be less 
intrusive to those with particular religious convictions. Similarly, free-
dom of expression rights may require that students have access to a 
wide variety of religious viewpoints. This is consistent with the Elgin 
County case, which suggested that teaching about religion and fostering 
moral values without indoctrination into a particular faction would not 
102 Michael E. Manley-Casimer & Pat Pitsula, “The Charter, Culture and the Public School” 
(1988-89) 1 Educ. & L.J. 37 at 41-42.
103 McKay, supra note 76 at 185.
104 McKay & Lewis, supra note 90.
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be a breach of the Charter.105 In essence, recognizing the freedom of 
expression interest of children would mean that they were exposed to 
more ideas, not fewer. Finally, the recognition of freedom of expression 
rights for students would provide school authorities with the use of sec-
tion 1 of the Charter as a decision-making tool. Section 1 allows for the 
“reconciling of individual and community rights”106 and as such could 
be a valuable tool for educators in balancing the effects of a book ban 
on the interests of each of the parties involved. As one author suggests, 
“[s]ection one allows [a] contextual approach…it goes beyond a strict 
technical analysis to a careful consideration of whether school policy 
promotes or unduly impedes a democratic society.”107
4. The Importance of Freedom of Expression to the Individual 
The recognition of a studentʼ’s freedom of expression right serves anoth-
er more personal function within the education system. Not all instances 
of censorship in schools carry the weight of other potential Charter vio-
lations, as was the case in Chamberlain. Sometimes, a book is banned 
for other reasons. In 1995, a group of parents in Halifax, N.S. demanded 
the removal of R.L. Stineʼ’s Goosebumps and Fear Street series because 
the books depicted excessive violence and illustrated a lack of respect 
for parental authority.108 In 2000, John Steinbachʼ’s Of Mice and Men 
was attacked by the Reform Party in Winnipeg because of the bookʼ’s 
use of profanity.109 In 1991, Judy Blumeʼ’s Blubber was challenged be-
cause it contained no moral message and because the “bully” in the 
novel was never punished.110 While those advocating for these removals 
were interested in protecting children from harm, exposure to new ideas 
promotes independent thinking for the sake of the individualʼ’s own per-
sonal growth and fulfillment:
105 Re Corporation of the Canadian Civil Liberties Association et. al v. Ont. Minister of Educa-
tion (1990), 65 D.L.R. (4th) 1 at 4 (Ont. C.A.).
106 Lorraine Eisenstat Weinrib, “The Supreme Court of Canada and Section One of the Charter” 
(1988) 10 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 469 at 438.
107 Watkinson, supra note 59 at 55. 
108 Schools Case Study, supra note 16.
109 Ibid.
110 Sova, supra note 14 at 53.
BANNING BOOKS . . . 151 
Encountering new ideas that may be foreign, frightening, infuriating 
or repulsive and forming opinions about those ideas distinct from 
those of oneʼ’s family or community is part of the learning process 
that occurs by reading books.111
When students are restricted from accessing certain ideas and themes 
that donʼ’t fall within a protected sphere under the Charter, or under the 
requirements of education legislation, they are denied access to ideas 
that may be vital to their own self-realization. Moreover, the motivations 
for the protection of children illustrated in M.R.M., while still relevant 
in terms of school safety, may have no place in matters of curriculum 
selection and freedom of expression, as it restricts a childʼ’s self-fulfill-
ment. While dissenting at the justification stage of a 2(b) violation in 
Irwin Toy, Justice McIntyreʼ’s insights are still relevant:
Freedom of expression is too important to be lightly cast aside or 
limited. It is ironic that most attempts to limit freedom of expression 
and hence freedom of knowledge and information is justified on the 
basis that the limit is for the benefit of those whose rights will be 
limited. It was this proposition that motivated the early church in 
restricting access to information, even to prohibiting the promulgation 
and reading of the scriptures in a language understood by the people. 
The argument that freedom of expression was dangerous was used to 
oppose and restrict public education in earlier times. The education 
of women was greatly retarded on the basis that wider knowledge 
would only make them dissatisfied with their role in society.112
Protecting children from “harmful” ideas is an outdated basis upon 
which to make curriculum decisions, and is contrary to the Charter. 
A broad and liberal interpretation of a studentʼ’s freedom of expression 
right properly rejects the protectionist model and recognizes the impor-
tance of reading to a childʼ’s self-fulfillment, augmenting the position 
of the child at the centre of the educational process. This last point is 
directly tied to a studentʼ’s participatory role in the education system. 
111 Swindler, supra note 30 at 121.
112 Irwin Toy, supra note 34 at 1008.
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5. Freedom of Expression Enhancing the Participatory Role of 
Children 
Related to the purposes of enhancing the democratic nature of schools 
and avoiding indoctrination, is the goal of increasing participation of 
children in the education process. Recognizing a studentʼ’s freedom of 
expression interest in book banning or curriculum selection decisions 
puts the childʼ’s interest at the centre of the decision-making process. 
This, in turn, augments the participatory nature of the school environ-
ment by giving students a stake in this process. Moreover, it is consistent 
with an approach advocated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Eaton 
v. Brant County Board of Education.113 In Eaton, the Court recognized 
the need for a child-centred approach in considering the educational 
needs of a disabled child. However, this approach is applicable to all 
children in matters of educational decision-making: 
The requirements for respecting these [equality] rights in this 
setting are decided by adults who have authority over this child. 
The decision-making body, therefore, must further ensure that its 
determination of the appropriate accommodation for an exceptional 
child be from a subjective, child-centred perspective—one which 
attempts to make [equality] rights meaningful from the child's point 
of view as opposed to that of the adults in his or her life114
For older children, a child-centred approach could mean that the stu-
dentsʼ’ own views be heard in matters affecting them. For younger chil-
dren, a “best interests of the child” approach would ensure their partici-
pation in the educational process. As one author notes, “[t]he challenge 
for schools and for the education system is to develop structures and 
to establish practices such that the right to participation can be exer-
cised.”115 A clearly defined freedom of expression right is one way to 
implement a procedure wherein both student participation and student 
needs are central to the decision-making process. 
Recognizing a studentʼ’s interest in potential book banning situations 
is also consistent with Canadaʼ’s international obligations. The United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child came into force in Sep-
113 [1997] 1 S.C.R. 241 [Eaton].
114 Ibid. at 277-78.
115 R. Brian Howe & Katherine Covell, “Schools and the Participation Rights of the Child” 
(2000) 10 Educ. & L.J. 107 at 113.
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tember 1990 and has been ratified by Canada.116 In general, it recognizes 
that children have fundamental rights as individual persons. As R. Brian 
Howe and Katherine Covell note, the Convention is based upon princi-
ples of non-discrimination, best interests of the child, and age appropri-
ate participation,117 and includes the right to freedom of expression.118 
Among the provisions of the Convention, Article 28 provides a child 
with the right to an education and Article 29 gives direction with respect 
to what that education should accomplish. Specifically, Article 29 pro-
vides that education should develop: 
(a) A childʼ’s personality, talents and mental and physical 
capabilities
(b)  A childʼ’s respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms
(d)  The preparation of the child for responsible life in a free 
society, in the spirit of understanding, peace, tolerance, equality 
of sexes, and friendship among all peoples, ethnic, national and 
religious groups and persons of indigenous origin.119
The Convention clearly states that ratifying countries should teach chil-
dren about human rights and freedoms, diversity, and tolerance. Using 
freedom of expression to create a rights discourse and expose children 
to a wide variety of view points will go far towards achieving this pur-
pose; however, as Howe and Covell further articulate, the signing of 
the convention also puts the rights of children at the centre of public 
policy:
It officially puts to rest older assumptions about primary rights 
of parents and the role of the paternalistic state in protecting the 
interests of children, who were regarded as immature “not yets” 
rather than rights-bearing persons in the here and now. With the 
signing of the Convention, the rights of children are now to be the 
central objective of public policy.120
116 International Convention on the Rights of the Child, U.N. Doc. A/RED/44/25 (1989) [Con-
vention].
117 Howe & Covell, supra note 115 at 109.
118 Convention, supra note 123 at Art 13.
119 Convention, supra note 123 at Art 29.
120 Howe & Covell, supra note 115 at 109.
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Recognizing a studentʼ’s freedom of expression rights in possible book 
banning situations puts the child at the centre of educational policy deci-
sions by ensuring a section 2(b) analysis, and a determination that those 
rights are infringed as minimally as possible. 
V. CONCLUSION
In terms of thwarting incidences of book banning, Chamberlain was in 
many ways a success. However, where freedom of expression interests 
were so clearly implicated, it is remarkable that the Court found against 
the book removals without engaging in a discussion on the nature and 
scope of such rights in the classroom. Arguably, they would not have 
been able to do so had the case not also called into question the meaning 
of “secularism” in the School Act. As discussed, in order to combat book 
banning cases without religious implications, a dialogue on the freedom 
of expression rights of children in classrooms is crucial. 
It is still uncertain what a studentʼ’s right to freedom of expression 
might look like. The Canadian jurisprudence on section 2(b) rights sug-
gests that there will be both inherent and external limits on such rights in 
the educational sphere. American case law supports this estimation and 
proposes further limitations. This would be a most undesirable approach 
to follow, first due to the lack of clarity in the actual language of the 
limitations, but more importantly because freedom of expression rights 
are of fundamental importance to a democratic society, and are critical 
in fostering a democratic classroom environment. Moreover, a clear and 
liberal interpretation of a studentʼ’s expression rights offers substantial 
benefits to educational policy-makers as they struggle with potentially 
contentious curriculum selection issues. Such a definition may become 
valuable in assuaging competing interests and ensuring a child-centred 
approach in educational decision-making. While it is beyond the scope 
of this paper, defining the expression rights of students would also be 
beneficial to educators and students beyond the context of book ban-
ning. Current debates surrounding Internet filtering in schools and the 
online communications of students raise freedom of expression issues 
that demand resolution. A clear and liberal definition of a studentʼ’s ex-
pression rights in Canada could not be more timely.  
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William Butler Yeats once wrote “[e]ducation is not the filling of a 
pail but the lighting of a fire.” Presumably, he meant that the education 
system should be less concerned with the mechanics of reading, writing, 
and arithmetic and more concerned with provoking thought and inspir-
ing students to learn. This desire to learn can only be sparked through 
exposure to a variety of ideas and points of view. Clearly recognizing 
and liberally defining a studentʼ’s right to both expression and access 
to information, and engaging students in a dialogue on their rights and 
the rights of others, will help light that fire. Moreover, freedom of ex-
pression is an essential way of bridging the divide between conflicting 
points of view. If we donʼ’t allow this in our schools, we are burning the 
very bridges that the education system should seek to build.
